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Athenian Stranger:
"Thus, explain to me stranger, certainly I still have the
desire for you to continue to speak and explain how all of
this is to be found in and gleaned from the laws that are
said to be from Zeus and the Pythian Apollo, the laws laid
down by Minos and Lycurgus. Certainly, I would also like
you to follow up and teach us why and how it is that their
order is so clear to anyone with experience in laws, either
because of technical skills and specialized abilities or
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because of certain habits, while it remains quite unapparent
to the rest of us."
The Laws, by Plato, 632D-632E1
I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Alejandro Guzmdin Brito has blessed us with an
opus that synthesizes a conceptual historical void in scholarship,
and in so doing, is destined to become a classic and premier contri-
bution to the historical account of the codification of the civil law
in Iberoamerica. Much like the symmetry and structure evinced
by the entire geometric edifice that we encounter in consulting
Euclid's Elements, so too Professor Guzmdn Brito has availed him-
self of definitions, postulates, and propositions all endemic to the
task that he quite modestly has elected as The History of the Codi-
fication of Civil Law in Iberoamerica.2 Whether the architecture
of this meaningful contribution intentionally sought foundation in
the analytical construct of Euclidian geometry is materially less
meaningful than the uncontroverted premise that indeed it is bot-
tomed on presumably unassailable precepts that rest and build
upon each other. Their intimacy and interdependence are such
that a part cannot be modified without measurably altering the
integrity of the whole. So too is the whole only possible by incre-
mentally developing sequentially harmonized premises.
A second distinctive feature, far beyond mere chorological
editing and topical indexing, immediately challenges both reader
and author, actor and spectator. Indeed, this jarring concern
recurrently pervades Professor Guzmdn Brito's brilliant effort.
The issue is as simple to identify as it is impenetrably difficult to
satisfy analytically. Perhaps unbeknownst to Professor Guzmdn
Brito, his scholarly achievement does not limit itself to the task of
compilation and incident assemblage of historical events narrowly
constrained by a very specific subject matter. Instead, the
author's extraordinary passion and erudition guide him to engage
in the very activity that he purports to be describing, but certainly
not defining. Put simply, his text is an exercise in historical codi-
1. XUTW , W) 4vot, tYWYE OEAoV 6v 6pa; Ka Ti vuv o6,opat, 8tE4E,0Ev nTw; tv TOL;
TOu Ato; XEyopkvoti v6pot; Tot; TE "rou Flu0iou An6Awvo;, ou; MivWq TE Kai AuKoupyo;
tUTrV, wEoT TE TrVT'a TaVTa, Kai 6Tr T641V TIV6 Etn(p6Ta a8I6andA ETI TU- "TEp. v6pwv
PTrE.IW TtXVfr EITE Kai TI.V EI, TOI 8i & O; PtV 06.JiW; 9OTI KaTa(gavfl
[Translation by the author.]
2. ALEJANDRO GuzM AN BRITO, HISTORIA DE LA CODIFICACION CIVIL EN
IBEROAMERICA [THE HISTORY OF CIVIL CODIFICATION IN IBEROAMERICA] (Thomsonl
Aranzadi, 2006).
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fication, not merely a factual compilation. The phenomenology of
the work shies from engaging in the perplexing inquiry that seeks
to distinguish compilation from codification.
Space and time render it virtually impossible logistically and
conceptually to map with the requisite painstaking detail the first
principles, definitions, and propositions upon which Professor
Guzmdn Brito's work rests in a carefully fashioned edifice parallel
to the configuration of Euclid's Elements. Certainly, fundamental
premises or first principles, to some extent, shall and must be
identified. The methodology, however, by which first principles
are arrived at is too great a challenge to undertake here.
In tracing the contours of the specific issues raised in Profes-
sor Guzmdn Brito's work, emphasis must be placed on addressing
the distinction between form and substance, compilation and codi-
fication. Without even purporting to approach a conclusive ana-
lytical rubric aspiring to air with any degree of detail this
difference, the subject compels analysis, commentary, and obser-
vation. Glaring because of its stark omission is any effort by Pro-
fessor Guzmdn Brito to engage in sustained examination of the
actual codification process beyond quite detailed scholastic refer-
ences to diverse influences and paragons that form part of the civil
law codification process and its place in the history of
Iberoamerica.
It is critical to question whether the codification that Profes-
sor Guzmdn Brito identifies actually comports with an endeavor
surpassing a pastiche of juridic compilation having no reason for
being other than the historical consequence and happenstance of
the particular identity of the colonizing empire. Specifically, Pro-
fessor Guzmdn Brito's book irks the reader to ask the simple but
exquisitely challenging questions: what exactly constitutes the
nature of codification? What is a code? Can a body of laws where
the individual elements are related only by legislative procedure
or royal fiat, general subject matter, language, and a discernable
format, constitute a code? If not, what else is necessary? Should a
juridic code bare a greater rational relationship and resemblance
to Euclid's Elements than to a topical index of legislative
enactments?
To be sure, these queries are not directly posed in the work
that now so much concerns us. Professor Guzmdn Brito does, or
so this author shall suggest, respond to these questions by himself
engaging in what shall here be termed the act of historical codifi-
cation. In identifying underlying first principles (i.e. five such
506 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:3
specific tenets), underscoring unifying objectives, dissecting com-
mon pronouncements that cannot be partially modified without
affecting the very rudimentary nature of the entire relationship
between Castile and the New World,3 Professor Guzmdn Brito has
brought into high relief the elements of the independence move-
ment in Latin America. A derivative consequence of his work is a
substantive commentary on the nature of the independence effort
that spawned modem day Latin America. Remarkably, and with-
out attempting to proffer an answer or solution to the question of
whether the account that Professor Guzmdn Brito relates is more
one addressing compilation rather than codification or the con-
verse, one proposition must be noted. If Professor Guzmdn Brito
is indeed correct in two critical assertions, or first principles, upon
which his entire work rests, namely that (i) judicial unity in the
new world was possible only because its formation and transfor-
mation did not intercept with, and was only parallel to political
influences, and (ii) independence in the Americas was premised on
concern for political changes that did not cause fundamental
restructuring of social and civic values, then, so the argument
says, the independence movement was less revolutionary and
more of just a mere initiative grounded on perceived need and pas-
3. In the very first paragraph of his book Professor Guzmdn Brito defines the
"New World" in the process of articulating the most extraordinary pronouncement
that the new world's geopolitical sub-division in virreinatos and governments do not
affect the unity of this vast territory because such structural organization and
compartments are only administrative, judicial, and military in nature, and not
political. Professor Guzmd.n Brito's exact words followed by the author's translation
merit citation in their entirety: Hasta que se consumo el proceso de independencia de
las secciones americanos de la Corona castellana, que dio por resultado la formaci6n
de otras tantas repdblicas soberanas, el territorio de Norteamdrica comprendido en las
actuales California, Texas, otras regiones de los Estados Unidos y Mdxico completo,
toda Centroamdrica y la totalidad de Sudamdrica, con excepcidn del Brasil y otras
regiones menores, constitutan una unidad politica, precisamente por hacer parte de
aquella Corona. Su divisi6n en virreinatos y gobernaciones, por cierto, no afectaba
esta unidad, por no tener cardcter politico tal divisi6n, sino s6lo administrativo,
judicial y militar.
Until such time as the various sections of the Castilian crown secured their
independence, which in turn gave rise to the creation of other sovereign republics,
such as all of North America comprising the current states of California, Texas, and
other regions of the United States and Mexico, all of Central America, and the whole
of South America, with the notable exception of Brazil and other more minor regions,
these parts of the Castilian crown constituted a monolithic political unit in large
measure because they formed part and parcel of that kingdom. Their division into
various geopolitical territories while under the Spanish crown, more commonly
known as virreinatos and gobernacioness, in fact did not affect this single unit
because these subdivisions were not political in nature but rather only
administrative, judicial, and military. [Translation by the author].
2008] CIVIL CODIFICATION IN IBEROAMERICA
sion for autonomy. Here one must question whether in fact it is
possible at all for judicial processes to be meaningfully severed
from their contemporaneous political framework?
This question too shall be underscored as six specific topics
configuring Professor Guzmdn Brito's work are examined:
(i) What is the precept of pre-independence judicial unity
that led to codification?,
(ii) Is there a meaning to the role of juridic literature in
the new world as described by Professor Guzmdn
Brito?,
(iii) Juxtaposing political systems with judicial frame-
works,
(iv) Analysis of legislaci6n de patria,
(v) The state of the law prior to codification,
(vi) Is there a discernable spirit of codification?
While even the most comprehensive analysis of these issues
fails to do justice to Professor Guzmdn Brito's notable contribu-
tion, we are compelled to study critically each proposition in the
context of codification versus compilation, together with political
change versus social reform.
II. WHAT IS THE PRECEPT OF PRE-INDEPENDENCE JUDICIAL
UNITY THAT LED TO CODIFICATION?
Professor Guzmdn Brito compellingly argues that (i) Castile's
emphasis in governing the New World by emphasizing adminis-
trative, judicial, and military concerns in lieu of engrafting upon
these vast and varied territories a pristine and definable political
scheme, and (ii) a development of a judicial unity among these ter-
ritories parallel to political transformations, arose from one soli-
tary fundamental predicate: the rule of Castile over the New
World. It is further contended that consciousness of the vastness
of the American territory comprising the New World was not
accompanied by a perceived need to craft flexible political stric-
tures, each unique in character so as to provide a voice for the
idiosyncratic nature of each of these regions.' It does follow that
the New World became but an extension of Castile even though,
4. Professor Guzmdn Brito provides: La unidad juridica Indiana, no habiendo
sido consecuencia de la politica, fue en realidad paralela a ella; vale decir, ambas
resultaron ser efecto de otro hecho fundamental: la incorporaci6n de las Indias, ya a
poco de su descubrimiento, a la Corona de Castilla, complementado por un hecho
negativo: que cuando los gobernantes espaholes empezaron a tomar conocimiento
paulatino de la inmensidad de los nuevos territorios descubiertos, no pensaron en
desmembrarlo para formar varias unidades politicas, a modo de reinos, por ejemplo,
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as Professor Guzmdn Brito observes, the incorporation of these
territories was one that the crown and not the kingdom under-
took. Indeed, this pivotal distinction played a decisive role in the
ideology that pervaded the independence of the New World.'
Codification or compilation, as the case may be, cannot be
severed from the phenomenon of juridic unity that the author
identifies. In turn that unity found foundation in five bodies of
law that Castile promulgated together with the European tenet of
ius commune. Without casting them in order of priority or hierar-
chy, they are easily susceptible to summary. First, the Leyes de
Toro merit mention. This corpus of positive law was contained in
the Nueva Copilaci6n and later in the Novisma. The Novisma
represents a compilation of strictures that primarily concern
issues involving estates, inheritance, and family law.' In this con-
nection, Charles V in 1530 formally decreed that the laws of Cas-
tile would rule the New World in conformance with the Ley de
Toro.' The centralized imperative to extend the laws of Castile to
desvinculadas entre si, sin perjuicio de su vinculaci6n radial al monarca, segan el
modelo que regia para la peninsula.
The juridic unity of the new world, not having been a consequence of its political
unification, was parallel to its political counterpart. Both were the direct effect and
consequence of another fundamental fact; the crown of Castile's rule over the new
world immediately after its discovery. This proposition was accompanied by a
negative development. According to Professor Guzmdn Brito, as the Spanish rulers
slowly began to note the vastness of the newly discovered territories, it did not occur
to them to fragment these lands in order to create multiple political units such as, for
example, the formation of quasi independent states among themselves without in any
way jeopardizing their profound ties to the monarchy: perhaps consonant with the
model that was prevalent in the Iberian peninsula. [Translation by the Author.] Id. at
32.
5. Id. at 33.
6. Id. at 34
7. This decree provided: Ordenamos y mandamos, que en todos los casos,
negocios y pleitos en que no estuviere decidido ni declarado lo que se debe proveer por
las leyes [de esta Recopilaci6n], o por cddulas, provisiones y ordenanzas dadas y no
revocadas para las indias, y las que por nuestra orden se despacharen, se guarden las
leyes de nuestro Reino de Castilla, conforme a la de Toro, asi en cuanto a al
substancia, resoluci6n y decisi6n de los casos, negocios y pleitos, como a la forma y
orden de substanciar. La expresi6n de esta recopilaci6n, por cierto, fue interpolada en
el original al insertarse 6sta en la Recopilaci6n de 1680.
It is ordered and decreed that in all cases, transactions, and contentions where
issues are not addressed by applicable law (those of this Recompilation) or by decrees,
provisions, and ordinances in place that have not been revoked for the territories of
the new world, as well as those that may issue by virtual decree, all should be
safeguarded in accordance with the laws of the Kingdom of Castile and harmonized
with La Ley de Toro as to substance and adjudication of all cases, transactions, and
contentions together with methodologies to be applied in any such processes."
[Translation by the Author.]
Professor Guzmdn Brito observed that the expression "de esta Recopilaci6n", of
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the Americas is certainly beyond cavil. Moreover, Professor Guz-
mdn Brito methodically details the multiple compilations and re-
compilations that characterized the laws of Castile from 1348 to
1567,9 and even until the end of the Epoca Hispdnica in 1805.10
Second, El Fuero Real, third, Las Leyes del Estilo, fourth, Las
Siete Partidas and fifth, Roman law, all are identified as funda-
mental features of the intricate web of the Castilian normative
framework. The Fuero Real together with the code of Las Siete
Partidas are highlighted as being most dominant and important."
The code of Las Siete Partidas embodies private and public law.
Accordingly, with respect to private law issues governing family
law, contractual obligations, together with wills and estates, Las
Siete Partidas was the dominant source of organic law. To a lesser
extent, but still considerable, weight was placed on the Fuero Real
as well. The code of Las Siete Partidas, in particular, is vested
with meaningful concepts derived from Roman law. Indeed, as
Professor Guzmdn Brito points out, despite the prevalence of the
ius communs, its role rests on the Roman law precept comprising
it, which in turn constitutes an interpretative paradigm for Las
Siete Partidas and the Fuero Real.
III. Is THERE A MEANING TO THE ROLE OF JURIDIC
LITERATURE IN THE NEW WORLD AS DESCRIBED BY
PROFESSOR GUzMAN BRITO?
The complexity of Castilian law in the New World is crystal-
lized by Las Leyes Nuevas of 1542, which Professor Guzmdn Brito
underscores as "having been spawned and made clear as a result
of a very intense doctrinal debate." 2 The corpus of juridic litera-
this "recompilation" was included in the original when the decree was inserted in the
recompilation of 1680.
8. See Id. at 33.
9. See Id. at 34. Citing PPREZ MARTfN, ANTONIO-SCHULTZ, JOHANES-MICHAEL,
LEGISLACION Y JURISPRUDENCIA EN LA ESPAN4A DEL ANTIGUO RI8GIMEN 15-20
(Universidad de Valencia 1978), and AHoPA, MARIA E. IZQUIERDO, JOS9, M' . Josg, EL
ORDENAMIENTO DE MONTALVO Y LA NUEVA RECoPILAcION, EN CUADERNOS DE HISTORtA
DEL DERECHO 451 (Madrid, 1999).
10. Citing AHoRA ESCUDERO, Josg ANTONIO, SOBRE LA G9NEsIS DE LA NovfSImA
RECOPILACION 11 (2003).
11. Notably, the code of Las Siete Partidas is comprised of a book addressing
issues of public and private law. Professor Guzmdn Brito highlights that there is no
extant omnibus work addressing Las Siete Partidas nor is there an analysis
constituting an extensive commentary on this pinnacle work. Professor Guzmdn
Brito, however, does cite to extensive authority, primarily in the form of journal work,
touching upon the subject. See GuzMAN BRITO, supra note 1, at 39 n.29.
12. Id. at 43.
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ture invested with doctrinal normative standing, according to Pro-
fessor Guzmdn Brito, is deeply influenced by both jurists and
theologians. The names Juan de Solorzan6 Pereira, Antonio de
Leon Pinero, Juan Matienso, and Juan Hevia Bolafios are high-
lighted as emblematic contributors to the juridic literature of the
time. In this same vein, the Recopilaci6n de Leyes de India is also
cited as a general commentary that was proscribed in 1776 in
keeping with the prevalent trend followed in Eighteenth Century
Europe that was inimical to legal commentary as standing in pari
materia with legislative positive law. Commentaries, however,
were still used as recourse for addressing voids in the corpus of
Roman law. The laws of Castile similarly were supplemented by
canon law, which was subordinate to Roman jurisprudence. Con-
sequently, the juridic literature was reduced to scholarship and
commentary of archaic constructions of Roman and canon law.
The salient feature of the juridic structure of the New World
certainly was characterized by codes and compilations: La Recopi-
laci6n de Leyes de las Indias of 1680, local legislation, La Nueva
Recopilaci6n of 1567, the Ordenamiento de Montalvo, and the
Novisima Recopilaci6n of 1805. These codes or compilations were
consulted within the framework of the corpus idus cibilis, which
in turn comprised four books; (i) The Institutions, (ii) the Digesta,
(iii) the Codex Iustinianus, and (iv) the Iustiniani Novellae. Also
in the same spirit as codes and compilations, canon law was con-
stituted by six distinct books: (i) the Decreto, (ii) the Decretales of
Regorie IV, (iii) the Liber Sextus of Bonafis VIII, (iv) the Constitu-
tiones Clementinae of Clement V, (v) the Extravangantes of John
XXII, and (vi) the Extravangantes Comunes.'3
Despite the excellent and exhaustive scholarship identifying
the complex elements of Castilian law, its influence in the New
World, and the more fundamental legal sources, little attention is
placed on the numerous differences between compilations, codes,
and the act of codification. Absent from the analysis is any refer-
ence to European, New World, or even Castilian standards for cod-
ification or compilation. Likewise, other than fleeting references
to usage, there is scarce guidance explaining the basis for hierar-
chy or methodology to be used in assessing different bodies of law.
Even though, by way of example, the reader is advised of the sub-
ject matter of Las Siete Partidas, there is simply no discussion as
13. Id. at 47. Professor Guzman Brito also canvasses the internal characteristics
of the laws of the new world by engaging in an exegesis of Las Siete Partidas, El Fuero
Real, and the Leyes De Toro. See, e.g., id. at 50-52.
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to any doctrinal, jurisprudential, or procedural common denomi-
nator that would bestow upon them the status of a code in contrast
to a plain compilation or collection of topically related mandates.
The want of this analysis, to a considerable extent, clouds the
proposition that political and legal developments occurred sepa-
rate and distinct from each other in parallel fashion never
intercepting.
IV. JUXTAPOSING POLITICAL SYSTEMS WITH
JUDICIAL FRAMEWORKS
A rudimentary principle and fulcrum of Professor Guzmdn
Brito's work is the proposition that in the New World political and
judicial developments were separate and unrelated phenomena.
The term "judicial" is defined as private civil law but also includes
procedural and criminal jurisprudence. The precept asserts that
the judicial realm survived the incessant tribulation and organic
law of the independence movement in the Americas virtually
intact. Put simply, Professor Guzmdn Brito juxtaposes the defini-
tion of judicial with the political, which in turn is generically ref-
erenced by "changes in political laws rendered evident by a
plethora of written constitutions patterned after liberal republi-
can regimes."14 Professor Guzmdn Brito, however, does concede
that the radical act of independence necessarily must have some
"immediate and necessary effect on private civil law." 5 Thus, it is
asserted that, unlike the French or Bolshevik revolutions, the
independence movement in the Americas had a purely political
configuration and was impervious to social and economic changes.
This premise perhaps may find resonance and relevance in the
much socially stratified contemporary societies of Latin America,
as a very general proposition. Economic independence does not
necessarily lead to social reform, according to Professor Guzmdn
Brito's analysis. In fact, where independence, albeit derivatively
from a political movement, is elevated to the status of a social
principle to be commercially applied with unbridled discretion in
its most pristine form; it is likely to be conducive to social frag-
mentation rather than the creation of a collective consciousness of
equality. The fierce competition that the principle of indepen-
14. Id. at 56.
15. Id. Here the end of Republican Rome and establishment of participates at the
conclusion of the first century A.D. or the substitution of feudalism by the absolute
state in the 16th Century are cited as paragons where political change did not affect
the substance of private civil law.
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dence breeds precisely fosters the view that the most skilled shall
prevail. It is inequality founded on differences displayed by inde-
pendent actors in the commercial and political arenas that is
underscored, highlighted, and rewarded.
A. Towards a Different Perspective
A glaring omission completes the contrasts of shadows and
lights that the reader experiences in studying Professor Guzmdn
Brito's work. The independence movement in the Americas can
hardly be severed from the concept of a substantive political
revolution. This particular detachment from the rule emanating
from the Iberian Peninsula cannot be reduced to just a want for
independence devoid of all content. In rejecting rule by the Span-
ish Crown, a monarchy theoretically purporting to find its norma-
tive foundation on more than the command of legions, divine right
flatly is being rejected. When viewed through a different prism,
independence from monarchical rule in the establishment of
republics permeated by the principle of independence arguably
emphasizes humanism and the virtues of equality, at least in form
if not substance. Additionally, Professor Guzm~n Brito's proposi-
tion that the rise of republicanism in the Americas caused consti-
tutional reform places considerable strain on the effort to
segregate constitutions from the legal realm and to treat the
drafting and acceptance of a constitution as an exclusively politi-
cal phenomenon. The anomaly in this proposition is clear. The
liberal constitutions adopted in the Americas are eloquent reflec-
tions of meaningful political and legal change. Indeed, a constitu-
tion is but the talisman of all jurisprudence and positive law.
When viewed through these lenses, Professor Guzmdn Brito's geo-
metrically symmetrical juxtaposition simply cannot be reconciled.
It is further asserted that because the independence move-
ment in the Americas limited itself only to the pursuit of economic
liberty, there was no pressing theoretical imperative for juridic
changes. In this connection, that argument continues,
purely political character was a trait common to all of
the Latin American independence movements [las
independencias hispano-americanas], so too shared by all
Latin American independent movements were the fruits of
no judicial change and the perpetuation of unity in that
very domain among all of the new sovereign states, which
at their birth did not seriously contemplate the derogation
of the old bodies of legislation inherited from the age of col-
512
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onies and substituting them for new and individual
legislation."16
Finally, the author concludes that "once independence was
successfully established, the archaic legislation that ruled in the
new world during times of monarchy continued to govern during
the advent of republicanism in all of the new states.17
By removing content from the revolution of the Americas and
advocating the rejection of monarchy, the establishment of repub-
lics, the adoption of republican constitutions, and the rejection of
divine right as the normative foundation of law and state, is it
possible for Professor Guzm~n Brito to adhere to the theory that
the Old World's laws persisted despite republican forms of govern-
ment and complete commercial independence from the Iberian
Peninsula? Four observations are exigent.
First, it is less than clear that republicanism is bereft of social
and economic content. Quite the contrary, the spirit of republi-
canism and the principles embodied in semiotic republican repre-
sentation bespeak a complete restructuring of the relationship of
individuals among themselves (citizens) and the state. There can
be no greater or more profound a juridic change than that which
transforms a subject "into" a citizen. This transformation defines
and redefines the vital space of the polis through the creation of
legal burdens and rights that find expression and a voice only
through law.
Second, through a straightforward exercise in phenomenology
(i.e. a merely descriptive narrative of events in the literary tradi-
tion of Homer's Iliad or the historical legacy of Thucydides' His-
tory of the Pelopenisian Wars where events are 'just" narrated and
described and not interpreted or subjected to the constraints of
conceptual categories) a simple and different account is brought
into focus. The newly found republics were very much populated
by the former "colonizers." In addition, a significant percentage of
the young republics' population was comprised by Spanish sub-
jects who had adopted the spirit of republicanism but retained
their sense of "nomos" from the Old World. The "criollos," as they
are called, were immersed in the spirit of Castile. They could not
help but embrace the habits that stem from a common religion,
language, and morality. If so, to the extent that laws are but a
reflection of the idiosyncratic relationship among citizens and
16. Id. at 57.
17. Id. Professor Guzmdn Brito cites to extensive authority for this general
proposition and subject matter. See id. n. 3.
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individuals with the state, it follows that the old legal regime, that
its citizenry embodied and reflected, should constitute the last
change of any revolutionary process. When viewed in this context,
Professor Guzmdn Brito's brilliant Euclidian historical exegesis
cannot withstand sustained scrutiny. Carving out substance from
liberty and independence in the revolution of the Americas so as to
render it void of any concern for the exiting social and economic
order is not a predicate for understanding a monolithic legal unity
of so vast a territory that is so analytically and aptly dissected.
B. The "Codification" of History
By organizing the History of the Codification of Civil Law in
Iberoamerica around such first principles, Professor Guzmin
Brito himself has engaged in a codification of history. The History
of the Codification of Civil Law of Iberoamerica is itself a "codifica-
tion of history." While the uniform juridic rubric certainly may
find explanation in the prominence and preeminence of Castile's
rule over the colonies, the enduring nature of that monolithic
structure does not have any rational relationship to Professor
Guzmtn Brito's construction of the revolutions of the Americas as
devoid of a social and economic agenda and concerned only with
independence, without more.
Third, absent from Professor Guzmdn Brito's effort is any con-
sideration of the practical workings of Castile's fundamental
sources of laws. Nationhood, national consciousness, and republi-
canism in large measure are not amenable to social and economic
concerns. As previously suggested, they necessarily lead to a
review and revision of organic law, jurisprudence, and customs
inherited from the ancien regime.
Fourth, Professor Guzmdn Brito's passing reference to the
Bolshevik and French revolutions as paradigms, for his purposes
as standing for the proposition that both upheavals led to political
and substantive social change, is susceptible to measurable chal-
lenge and critical analysis. The differences and common denomi-
nators between these events and the revolution of the Americas
undoubtly would take tomes to identify, let alone analyze. Here
comment is narrowly limited to features that were painfully
ignored among Professor Guzmdn Brito's observations.
Specifically, Professor Guzmdn Brito fails to note a material
distinction between a rejection of monarchies, certainly this ele-
ment pervades all three revolutions (Bolshevik, French, and New
World), and a repudiation of monarchical rule by a colonized peo-
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ple seeking independence from colonizers. Moreover, unlike other
independence movements, such as the United Kingdom's experi-
ence in India, the revolution of the Americas in many ways resem-
bled a civil war. By that time (the first half of the nineteenth
century) Spaniards quite often had crossed the Atlantic and
moved en masse to the New World. Colonizers and colonized had
generated multiple generations of criollos in the Americas who,
like Hegel's aufheben, both accepted and rejected the nomos of the
Old World. The independence movement of the Americas, in its
affinity to a civil war in many deep and penetrating instances,
necessarily was fought for more than mere independence.
The categories of colonizers, colonized, and subjects were
never simultaneously, or even sequentially, present in the French
and Bolshevik revolutions. The distance epitomized by an entire
Atlantic Ocean separating central authority from second-tier gov-
ernors loosely exercising supervised governance over the colonized
provides for even starker differences when compared to the
French and Bolshevik revolutions. Indeed, a comparison becomes
contrast. Yet, it is that very contrast that caused a need for a new
social and economic order. The added grievances and burdens
incident to "colonized" status in addition to that of "subjects"
wanting political representation in Spain and devoid of the equi-
ties that a vibrant central authority will exercise over its provin-
cial governors, relief in the form of a new revolutionary social
structure and economic independence must be assumed for most
who experienced the American independence movement.
The characterization of the American independence move-
ment as wanting in social content and economic autonomy miscon-
strues the phenomenon comprising the relationship between
Castile's subjects in the New World, government by Castile, and
the monarchy. In addition, it is but a proliferation of placing epi-
cycles upon epicycles on the part of Professor Guzmdn Brito in
ignoring the extent to which the substantive content of the French
and the United States revolutions permeated the winds of change
that swept through the Americas and caused the independence of
these vast territories during the first half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Also, the effort to engraft upon appearances a historical con-
struction that shuns the legal character of a constitution and its
reach as a judicial creature and not just a mere child of politics,
further contributes to the distortion upon which Professor Guz-
mdn Brito reposes his theory that juridic and political develop-
ments in the Americas took place in conformance with non-
515
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:3
intercepting parallel growth. Although interesting to be sure, the
theory raises more questions than it could ever satisfactorily
answer.
V. ANALYSIS OF LEGISLACION DE PATRIA
The anatomical structure and passion with which Professor
Guzmdn Brito articulates his theory of codification, political devel-
opment, and lack of social and economic content on the part of
American independence movement is also central to the text's
analysis of Legislaci6n Patria. The author's own words compel
recitation:
The ancient political, social, and economic regime in
Europe had been abolished by the French Revolution,
which elided absolutism and feudalism by substituting
them with liberalism in every respect. Napoleon's Code
Civile had provided a juridic structure to the new regime
that was very much a liberal social-economic order. By
1804, the Latin American Revolutions" of independence
served the identical purpose in the realm of the political as
did the French Revolution in Europe: in the Americas too
the ancien regimes absolutist monarchy had been abol-
ished; but in the New World 9 the social economic rubric of
feudalism did not exist. On other hand, royal legislation
that Castile enacted managed to penetrate the new world
much like the legislation that the new world itself promul-
gated, i.e. properly speaking, legislation indigenous to the
new world was very much influenced by and impregnated
with the structure of state police laws, which is what in fact
we have called Ordenancismo. Nonetheless, the substitu-
tion of the socio-economic indigenous order did not consti-
tute the substance of the independent movement's road
map. This feature also materially distinguished the inde-
pendence movement of the Americas from that of the
French revolution. Thus, feudal institutions inherited from
Spain were not altered or desecrated by the revolution in
the Americas.2 °
18. Professor Guzmdn Brito actually uses the world "hispano- amorica."
19. Here Professor Guzmdn Brito uses the word "India."
20. Id. at 57-58. Citation to the original text also is necessary: El antiguo r6gimen
politico, social y econ6mico habfa sido liquidado en Europa por la Revoluci6n
Francesa, que aboli6 el absolutismo, el feudalismo y el ordenancismo regio,
substituydndolos por el liberalismo en todos lo 6rdenes. NAPOLEON, con su Code
Civil, habia dado forma juridical al nuevo r~gimen socio-econ6mico liberal en 1804.
En Hispanoamdrica, las revoluciones de independencia cumplieron en lo politico el
mismo papel que la Revoluci6n Francesa en Europa: tambi6n ahi quedo liquidado el
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Having enunciated anew his central organizing principle,
Professor Guzmdn Brito engages in a painstakingly detailed anal-
ysis of the very critical Legislaci6n Patria. At the very outset he
notes that "[t]his movement revealed itself in a Legislaci6n Patria,
unique to each of the new states. The Legislaci6n Patria was
enveloped in a spirit of reform of the new age, i.e. liberalism."21
The purpose of this legislative framework, it is argued, was the
"derogation or modification of the old legislation."22
The significance that the text accorded to the Legislaci6n
Patria generally and to each state in particular cannot be mini-
mized as to other first principles upon which The History of the
Codification of Civil Law in Iberoamerica is bottomed. To be sure,
according to the argument, this legislative framework predated
codification. Therefore, changes endemic to the social or economic
order did not come into being together with or as a result of the
codification efforts throughout the Americas.23 Accepting this pre-
mise as another organizing principle to Professor Guzmdn Brito's
postulates, the author identifies seven examples of issues that the
new Legislaci6n Patria, in fact cloaked with the new mantle of
"liberalization" of a social and economic order, foisted onto the
Americas by the ancien regime.
First, it is observed that children of slaves ("libertad de vien-
tre") were freed in Chile pursuant to a Congressional Decree
antiguo r~gimen mondrquico absolutista. Pero en Indias no existi6 el r6gimen
econ6mico-social feudal. Con todo varias figuras singulares que se habian
desarrollado en el interior del Feudalismo europeo habfan sido trasladadas a Indias.
Por otra parte, la legislaci6n real tanto dada para Castilla que alcanzo a penetrar en
Indias, como la emitida directamente para estas filtimas, o seas, la legislaci6n
propiamente indiana, estaban, como vimos, muy impregnadas de intervencionismo y
dirigismo estatales (derecho de policfa), que es en definitiva lo que hemos denominado
ordenancismo. Ahora bien, la substituci6n de este orden socio-econ6mico indiano no
constituyo ningdln articulo del programa independentista; ello tambidn diferenci6 a la
independencia Americana de la Revoluci6n Francesa. De este modo, ambas
tradiciones integrantes del orden indiano, aquella de las instituciones feudales como
la del ordenancismo regio formaron parte no modificada de la herencia de los Estados
sucesores y la creaci6n de dstos no implic6 ninguna mudanza de dicho orden.
21. Id. at 58. Professor Guzm6n Brito uses the word "Liberalismo" that the author
translates as "liberalism."
22. Id.
23. Notably absent from Professor Guzm.n Brito's analysis is the reason (s)
occasioning La Legislaci6n Patria. In fairness, he does pay fleeting reference to the
gales of change of that time, but the readership is moved to ask how the legislaci6n
patria can be rightfully segregated from the very revolutionary effort without which
such legislation would remain in the inkwell reduced to a laudable aspiration:
laudable, but an aspiration none-the-less. Similarly, the readership is also compelled
to question whether the legislaci6n patria is susceptible of being divorced from the
codification movement affecting the various nascent states.
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issued on October 11, 1813. A similar enactment was also issued
in Argentina by decree on February 12, 1813. These laws consti-
tuted more than just a modest step toward the abolition of slavery
in the Americas. The preliminary predicate for the complete abo-
lition of slavery was enacted in Chile pursuant to La Ley del 24 de
Julio de 1823.24 On April 17, 1824, the Provincias Unidas de Cen-
troamdrica25 enacted Decreto del 17 de Abril de 1824. That very
same year, pursuant to La Ley del 13 de Julio de 1824, Mexico
enacted organic law leading to the abolition of slavery. The
Argentine Constitution of 1853 advanced similar decrees and leg-
islation earmarked towards the absolute abolition of slavery from
the social fabric of the Americas.26
Second, the restructuring of the social order contemplated, as
it must, eliding titles of nobility. The earliest example that Pro-
fessor Guzmdn Brito enunciates is the Decreto de La Asamblea
Constituyente del 21 de Mayo de 1813.27
Third, providing indigenous populations with civil rights con-
stitutes a rudimentary premise of the Legislaci6n Civil Patria.
These rights were granted in Argentina by the Decreto de la
Asamblea Constituyente del 12 de Marzo de 1813 and consonant
with the Constitution of 1819.28
Fourth, marriage among non-Catholics was extended to the
citizenry of the New World as a matter of right. This new entitle-
ment can be traced to Reglamento del 26 de Mayo 1833, in
Argentina.29
Fifth, intellectual property was accorded protection in Chile
in 1834, followed by Venezuela." Sixth, the provincial structure
pursuant to which every cultural activity and housing of every ilk
was supervised by quasi official landlords or landlord representa-
tives endowed with considerable "police authority" over workers
24. Id. at 59. References made to a specific legislation dated July 24, 1823
purporting to lead to the abolition of slavery.
25. Id. at 59.
26. Consider also, La Ley del 24 de Marzo de 1854 in Venezuela, and other similar
legislation that was enacted in that very same year in Perd. Id.
27. Comparable enactments were decreed in Chile by decree dated September 15,
1817, and in (Gran) Colombia pursuant to the constitution of 1821.
28. Id. Referencing a decree issued by the Constitutional Assembly. Professor
Guzmdn Brito also notes that on March 4, 1819, the "Senadoconsulto" in Chile issued
a similar decree as did Perd during the peak of San Martin's social and political
influence.
29. Similar pronouncements, Professor Guzmdn Brito observes, issued in Chile in
conformance with La Ley del 6 de agosto de 1844.
30. Id. Correspondingly, legislation was enacted in Perfi pursuant to La Ley del 3
de Noviembre de 1849.
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was eliminated by dint of legislative decree in Argentina in 1831.
Legislation of this very genre issued in (Gran) Colombia de Boli-
var (legislation dated July 10, 1824), in Peri (legislation January
11, 1830), and in Chile (legislation dated November 14, 1849). 1
Seventh, creditors' rights were materially restructured
throughout the Americas, first in Chile by decree dated November
8, 1823. Professor Guzmdn Brito chronicles that a similar decree
was issued in Argentina on March 29, 1836. The Legislaci6n
Patria in fact corroborates profound social engineering and eco-
nomic independence separate and apart from that present during
colonial rule. The text, however, fails to explain how such legisla-
tion, mostly constitutional in nature, could at all be anything but
the interception of legal development and political growth. Moreo-
ver, the disconnect between idiosyncratic geopolitical rules of law
and other strictures involved with normative standing is suscepti-
ble to meaningful interpretation irrespective of the independence
movement of the Americas. If indeed it is correct that "phenome-
nology precedes epistemology," then. Professor Guzmdn Brito has
opted for a more synthetic approach that altogether obviates
descriptive phenomenological "story-telling" for the organization
of sequential events through organizing "first principles." Profes-
sor Guzmdn Brito's observation that the Legislaci6n Patria or Der-
echo Patria was nourished by the liberal social economic ideas of
the time, expressly and directly conflicts with his premise that the
revolutionary independence movement of the Americas lacked
social and economic content, in part, because the New World
never experienced a feudalistic socio-economic regime. It is neces-
sary and worth noting, however, that the colonial socio-economic
configuration displayed all badges endemic to a feudal society.
Were the Legislaci6n Patria or Derecho Patria altogether to be dis-
associated from the independent movement of the Americas, it
then would best be characterized as a child, but only an illegiti-
mate child, of its time. To hold otherwise would be an anti-histori-
cal proposition.
Only by viewing the phenomenon of Legislaci6n Patria as a
sequentially fragmented event (i.e. one that is not part of the com-
pulsory consequences derived from the revolutionary indepen-
dence movement of the Americas) can both the independence
movement and codification be reinvented to fit Professor Guzmdn
Brito's novel and unique paradigm.
31. Id.
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VI. THE STATE OF THE LAW PRIOR TO CODIFICATION
With the rise and development of Legislaci6n Patria or Der-
echo Patria the legal structure of the nascent New World sover-
eignties acquired the elements of a complex mosaic where old and
new monarchies and liberal republics expressed a distinct juridic
character never before experienced in so vast a domain and galva-
nized by so particular a colonization effort. In this amalgamation
of ancien regime and liberal republicanism, Professor Guzm~n
Brito asserts two salient propositions. First, the Legislaci6n
Patria did not substitute or otherwise supplant the colonial legis-
lation preceding it. Second, the laws enacted during the colonial
reign assumed a non-vibrant "petrified" character reflecting an
existence without the vitality of historical relevance or context.2
In furtherance of these propositions, Professor GuzmAn Brito
finds analytical support in a number of legislative decrees that
deserve heightened scrutiny. The foundational document of
(Gran) Colombia enacted in the Villa del Rosario de Cdtucu on
October 6, 1821 reads:
It is hereby declared that those laws that until now have
governed are not to be displaced unless they directly or
indirectly encroach on or contradict this Constitution or the
laws enacted by Congress. 3
In this very same spirit, legislation dated May 13, 1825, by
the Congress of (Gran) Colombia, in Art. I provides:
The order or hierarchy with which laws are to be imple-
mented and followed in all tribunals and courts of the
Republic, irrespective of whether these tribunals are civil,
eclesiastics or military as well as in all civil law and crimi-
nal law matters, is the following: First, the decrees or suc-
cess of enactments issued by the legislative branch;
Second, the pragmatic decrees, orders, and ordinances that
the Spanish government sanctioned until March 18, 1808,
which were in effect and under the auspices of the Spanish
government itself through the entire territory comprising
the republic; Third, the laws of recompilation of the new
world ["Indias"]; Fourth, the laws embodied in the Nueva
Recopilaci6n de Castilla; and Fifth, those of the las Siete
Partidas 4
Professor Guzmdn Brito teaches that "these decrees later
32. Id. at 60.
33. Id. at 61.
34. Id. at 61.
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were embodied as Ecuadorian laws enacted on November 16, 1831
and on August 22, 1835.""S He also stresses that they inspired and
were influential on the laws of Nueva Granada and Colombia in
1857, 1864, and 1872.36
The provisional regulation provided for in art. II of the Mexi-
can Empire of 1822 plainly decreed that "[nionetheless, the laws
and decrees previously promulgated in the Empire's territory
until February 24, 1821 shall remain in full force and effect so
long as they do not conflict with current regulations, laws, orders
or decrees issued as a result of our independence."
37
The provisional regulation in Art. 2 of the Mexican Empire
dated 1822 commands close review. The actual plain language
highlighted in Professor Guzmdn Brito's work establishes a clear
connection between the Legislaci6n Patria and the independence
movements. A less strained construction of this mandate demon-
strates that the Legislaci6n Patria or Derecho Patria came into
being as a direct and proximate result of the independence move-
ment. Their role was precisely that of constituting a framework
that would institutionalize and provide expression for the new
social and economic order resulting from independence. Thus,
while Professor Guzmin Brito is remarkably precise in construing
the mosaic of old and new as one where high relief is engrafted
upon the new and a sharp lower relief on the old, it is challenging
to follow his logic in reasoning that this legislation, while a prod-
uct of the liberal republicanism of the time, has little or no rela-
tionship to any substance or principle underlying the
independence movement of the Americas. The circle simply can-
not be squared.3"
35. Id. ,
36. Citing FERNANDO MAYORGA GARdCA, PERVIVENCIA DEL DERECHO ESPASOL 189
(1991).
37. Id. The original language states: El art. 1 de la secci6n dltima del Estatuto
provisorio dado por el Protector de la libertad del Perd de 1821, declaraba: "Quedan en
su fuerza y vigor todas las leyes que regian en el Gobierno antiguo, siempre que no
estgn en oposici6n con la independencia del pais, con las formas adoptadas por este
estatuto y con los decretos o declaraciones que se expidan por el actual Gobierno."
38. Parallel legislation emphasizing the primacy of the Legislaci6n Patria and the
viability of the colonial legal framework that does not conflict or otherwise contradicts
the new legislative scheme is found in the following constitutional and legislative
article: (1) Article 97 of the Honduras Constitution of 1825 stated that "[t]he laws and
dispositions that are now in place and that do not negate or conflict with the federal
constitution or the state shall remain in full force and effect." (2) Art. 164 of the
Nicaraguan Constitution of 1826 reads that "[aill laws that until now have been in
effect shall remain in full force and effect so long as they do not conflict with the
constitution of the republic and or of the state, nor should they conflict with the laws
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Having accounted for the pre-code schematic of legislation in
the New World, Professor Guzmdn Brito asserts that two precepts
appeared as "relatively original" in the laws of the new American
nations. The first of these tenets "can be explained by the contrast
created by the former subjection to the crown of Spain and the
creation of new sovereign states." "This principle consisted in
contending that the Castilian colonial legislative system should be
observed [but for the legislative interpretation already refer-
enced], even though enacted by a despotic and feudal government"
that no longer exited in America. Thus, such legislation, despite
remaining in force, had lost context with the new and current
"constituci6n de la libertad."39 Professor Guzmdn Brito describes
the second tenet as "having been directed against the Derecho
Patria promulgated by the new states in as much as their contin-
gent qualities and idiosyncratic natures had increased the confu-
sion that already pervaded the colonial legislative schematic."
These two principles are presented as recurring lite motifs. They
are eloquently underscored in a message authored by Sim6n Boli-
var, dated February 15, 1819, that was read to the Congreso de
Angostura, which governed (Gran) Colombia:
Our laws are vanquished relics of old despotism, that this
monstrous edifice should fall and we [as a nation] remove
the ruins and create a temple dedicated to justice and
under the auspice of the divine inspiration of justice, fash-
ion a code of Venezuelan laws petitioning the establish-
ment and the impaneling of judges, the creation of jurists
and of a new code. I have asked Congress to engage in guar-
anteeing civil liberties for the correction of the most regret-
table abuses that our judiciary now suffers from because of
its tainted origin in Spanish legislation, which, like time,
gathers from all ages and all men works generated by tal-
ent as well as the fruits of the unreasonable, decrees well
reasoned as well as those that embodied outrage, the gath-
promulgated by the national legislatures of this state." (3) Most significantly, Art. 281
of the laws of Bolivia dated Jan. 8, 1827 commanded that "the old Spanish legislation
shall remain in effect so long as it does not contradict the Constitution and the laws
promulgated by the Government of Independence." Notably, as with Art. 2 Del
Reglamento Provisional del Imperio Mexicano de 1822, this legislation (Art. 281)
explicitly references the "Government of Independence", and thus, further suggests
that any construction placed on the legislation construing the colonial framework
must be in accord with principles from the independence movement in the form of
ordinances, decrees or laws.
39. Id. at 64. The exact word that Professor Guzmdn Brito uses in the cited text is
"desarmonia", which here has been translated as "had lost context", rather than the
more literal cognate translation "disharmony".
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ering of great monuments of wisdom as well as those that
oppressed the countries of Spain. It has served as a burden
much more carefully crafted than the ire of heaven has
caused on the suffering of this unfortunate empire."40
The twin principles that Professor Guzmdn Brito articulated
conceal more than they reveal. To be sure, the texts on which he
reposes the two "novel new world precepts" that inspired the codi-
fication movement, the most eloquent of which is exemplified by
Sim6n Bolivar's note to Congress, address confusion or unreasona-
ble idiosyncrasy arising either from the relationship between the
Leyes Patria and the laws of Spain or incident to the very nature
of the Leyes Patria. To the contrary, even the most surface analy-
sis of this text reflects that codification was driven by the very
forces of change and independence that characterized the inde-
pendence movement of the Americas. That revolutionary effort
witnessed the transformation from subject to citizen and from a
colony to a modern republic. It is the very ambiguity and chaotic
fabric of the laws of the ancien regime that galvanized the pleas
for codification.
Standing in contrast with Professor Guzmdn Brito's analysis,
these papers speak for themselves. Illustrative is the note that
the Minister of the Interior for Bolivia under the Andr6s de Santa
Cruz Administration, Mariano Enrique Calvo, served on the
Supreme Court during the ceremony held for the naming of the
commission of magistrates charged with drafting a civil code. It is
the need for change and modernity accompanying the spirit of
republican liberalism that is most outstanding in this text:
It is redundant the complete lack of order and confusion
present in them [referring to the laws of Spain], the multi-
plicity of its codes, the struggles and inconsistencies among
them, their duplicative nature, and antinomies arising
from their poor draftsmanship and the very archaic lan-
guage that they embodied, much of it is hardly in use.
These salient vices in the legislation that we inherited
raised from the virtually infinite contentions that impover-
ished citizens, disturbed the peace of all families, and
40. Id. The original text states: Asi, Sim6n Bolivar, en un mensaje de 15 de febrero
de 1819, leido ante el Congreso de Angostura, de que saldria erigida la (Gran)
Colombia, deca, aunque algo ret6ricamente:". . . nuestras leyes son funestas reliquias
de todos los despotismos antiguos y modernos; que este edificio monstruoso se derribe,
caiga y apartando hasta sus ruinas, elevemos un templo a la justicia; y bajo los
auspicios de su santa inspiraci6n, dictemos un c6digo de leyes venezolanas."
[Translation by the author.]
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perennially upset the Bolivarian forum. It is these laws
themselves that gave rise to injustices, both voluntarily
executed and involuntarily applied by the magistrates ...
It is from this very origin that the ever increasing number
of mediocre men of letters spawned. Perhaps human life is
incapable of understanding the perfect workings of the
signs of legislation so long as that legislation remains so
voluminous, archaic, and internally inconsistent, even
among its very codes. Those who are not completely com-
mitted to its scholarships would be unable to decide their
own rights and commercial obligations.4'
The close connection between the independence movement of
the Americas and codification is aptly captured by Juan Rodriguez
de San Miguel's Pandectas Hispano-Mexicanas edited in 1839:
Our legislation after almost 30 years of revolution, not only
a revolution of arms but also of customs, government, and
state, resents and is damaged more than any other by the
compilation, diversity, and uncertainty of laws. The mon-
archies of several centuries together with codes from Span-
ish Constitutions in addition to those recompiled and not
compiled at all arising from the days of colonialism, follow-
ing federal formatting as well as those of the structurally
centralized government, some with parts that are in full
force and effect while others have been changed and yet a
third part has been edited in accordance with nomencla-
tures and authorities relating to corporate matters and
causes that have altogether disappeared .... These attrib-
utes have been disbursed among the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches. Giving rise to a fierce chaos they
hamper the equitable administration of justice, delayed
and confused the authorities' ability to adjudicate properly
and impede learning. Because their amalgamation gives
rise to a universe of predicates that far surpass the likeli-
hood of any young student of the law's ability to master."
Patently absent from the very authority that Professor Guz-
mdn Brito cites in support of his twin propositions is even the
most passing of references to the terms "legislaci6n patria" or
"derechos de patria." Under no reasonable analysis of fact, logic or
law can it be inferred from the contemporaneous literature evinc-
ing a thirst and need for codification that the Derechos Patria or
41. Id. at 65. [Translation by the Author.]
42. Id. at 65-66. [Translation by the Author.]
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Legislaci6n Patria, together with legislation enacted pursuant to
colonial rule, can be served from the genesis of codification itself.
In addition, also painfully absent from Professor Guzmdn
Brito's account are examples of inconsistencies arising between
the Derecho Patria and colonial legislation that cannot be resolved
by the simple interpretative methodology bestowing preemption
status on the Leyes Patrias.
VII. Is THERE A DISCERNABLE SPIRIT OF CODIFICATION?
A fundamental tenet underlying Professor Guzmdn Brito's
thorough historical analysis is the principle that contemporary or
modern codification penetrated the spirit of the nascent Latin
American countries, or perhaps flourished after remaining dor-
mant, once the process of independence had matured.43 This focus
is consonant with Professor Guzmdn Brito's reliance on his chosen
first principles and postulates," separating and surgically segre-
gating political independence from judicial, social, and economic
reform. The very evidence upon which the theory purports to find
foundation is shaded and profoundly qualified by the author. The
want of a vision that encompasses simultaneous sequential analy-
sis is most strained even in the attempt to articulate this novel
construction. Specifically, Professor Guzmdn Brito first must
classify actual codification events in Latin America affecting its
greatest land masses and most material political domains as mere
"exceptions" to a more "general" rule. These "exceptions" cry for
closer scrutiny.
At the outset, it is observed that as early as 1811 the Vene-
zuelan Constitutional Congress agreed to create a commission
charged with drafting a civil and criminal code. Moreover, Vene-
43. Id. at 76. The original states: "Pero la idea moderna de la codificaci6n penetr6
en los espiritus, o quizd aflor6 de ahf, en donde yacia pasiva, por lo general una vez
consumado el proceso de la Independencia."
44. The five first principles and postulates around which Professor Guzmdn
Brito's "codification" of The History of Iberoamerica Codification of Civil Law is
organized can be synthesized into five precepts: (i) The postulate that political and
judicial development in the new world occurred simultaneously but without
intercepting, (ii) That constitutional doctrinal development in the new world is
separate and distinct from legal permutations or the institutionalization of
revolutionary tenets, (iii) The postulate that the independence and revolutionary
movement of the Americas was exclusively political in nature and, therefore, bereft of
any normative principle premised on social and economic reform, and (iv) The
understanding that this spirit and ideal of modern codification in Latin America did
not form part of the independence or revolutionary consciousness until after
independence had been secured, and (v) The postulate that derechos patria are
separate and distinct from the independence movement of the Americas.
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zuela's Federal Charter of 1811 also contemplated the drafting of
these varies codes.45 In the territory that ultimately became the
Republic of Argentina, an anonymously drafted constitution for
what was then known as the "Provincias del Rio de La Plata" of
1811 reference the need to draft a "brief and simple code."4" In
this same vein, in what was to become the Republic of Colombia,
the Constitution of 1811 embodied the command in its articles
that the legislative body was "to reform the code."47 Indeed, as
Professor Guzmdn Brito himself asserts, the Acta de Federaci6n
de Las Provincias Unidas de la Nueva Granada, dated November
27, 1811, provided that the Federaci6n was to engage in the "for-
mation of criminal and civil codes."48
Despite the characterization of these uncontroverted pre-
independence aspirations to reform and draft new civil and crimi-
nal codes, Professor Guzmdn Brito's text elects to temper further
the historical import of these pre-independence mandates for
codifications so as to conform with his organizing principles in
codifying the history of codification in Iberoamerica. He reduces
them to the status of exceptions that confirm the rule.49 It is not
necessary to engage in a sustained scholarly analysis to observe
that the "exceptions" and intentional disavowence of the regions
within the jurisdiction of the Constitution of Cddiz are emblematic
and not aberrant phenomena. They belie the general rule.
The examples upon which Professor Guzmdn Brito premises
"the general rule," likewise, undermine the very proposition. The
chronology of events is eloquent enough: (i) the Mexican Indepen-
dence in 1821 only preceded the decree prescribing civil, penal,
commercial, mining, agricultural, and fine arts codification by less
than one year;" (ii) it was in July of 1822, hardly four years after




48. Id. at 27.
49. Id. at 77. Quite significantly, in ascribing "exception" status, Professor
Guzmdn Brito finds no recourse but to state that "these cases [examples], assuming
that we also exclude those areas of the Spanish empire where the Constitution of
Cddiz were in full force and effect, as they embodied articles that also touched upon
codification, then certainly the idea of codification must be understood as something
of a phenomenon foreign to the independence process. These examples are but
exceptional moments of foresight that were not emulated. The general rule, thus, was
that only at the end of the independence process was attention focused on
Codification." [Translation by the Author.]
50. Id.
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Chile's Supreme Court, proposed a bill to the Constitutional Con-
gress suggesting substitution of the laws inherited from Spain by
implementing five Napoleonic Codes;51 (iii) (Gran) Colombia was
independent in 1819 and within three years General Francisco de
Paula Santander, in January 1822, decreed the formation of a
Commission charged with the codification of laws for the new
republic; 2 and (iv) Peril's Constitution of 1823, scarcely two years
after independence, prescribed the drafting of civil, criminal, mili-
tary, and commercial codes. 3
The chronology supports only a restrictive construction and
the most literal interpretation of the proposition that codification
and the independence movement are sequential and not contempo-
raneous. Even these "examples" point to simultaneity. When
viewed in a historical context, codification within one to three
years of a nation's birth is illustrative of an independence move-
ment that contemplated judicial, and thus social, reform as part of
its very reason for being.
A mandate for codification issued scarcely eighteen months
after a nation's independence date scarcely provides a factual
basis from which to conclude that codification is little more than
an extension of the independence process itself rather than a first
principle underlying independence, i.e. social and economic reform
and a new relationship between citizens and the state as well as
among citizens themselves.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Professor Guzmdn Brito's HISTORY OF THE CODIFICATION OF
CIVIL LAW IN IBEROAMERICA commands reading and re-reading. It
would not be an overstatement to assert that it is the most com-
plete single work in its field in the last twenty years. Its author's
laudable effort and achievement seeks more than just engaging in
a chronological recitation of the codification process. If a code, in
contrast with the compilation of legislation and juridic precepts,
must be bound by a ubiquitous judicial philosophy, thematic
coherence, subscription to common first principles, and uniformity
of terms, so too is Professor Guzmdn Brito's work more than a lit-
any of codification dates together with an attendant commentary.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. Professor Guzmdn Brito also cites to the codification process in El
Salvador, Bolivia, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Uruguay as further examples of his
postulate.
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Instead, he relies on five fundamental principles around which his
erudite analysis of the codification process is organized:
i. That the independence movement of the Americas was
exclusively political in nature and devoid of any content
purporting to affect social and economic reform;
ii. The postulate that political and judicial development in
the Americas' independence movement were parallel
and did not intercept;
iii. The tenet that constitutional development is separate
from legal permutations;
iv. That Derechos Patria are unrelated to the independence
movement of the Americas; and
v. The proposition that the spirit and ideal of modern codi-
fication did not form part of the independence move-
ment of the Americas until after independence was
achieved.
The whole of Professor Guzm~n Brito's account would be pro-
foundly altered were a single postulate altered, much like an
invisible geometry was created when Euclid's Fifth Postulate was
challenged. The beautiful edifice that Professor Guzmdn Brito
has shaped and molded through his analysis of the unique inde-
pendence movement of the Americas, representative of a historical
science that places synthesis before analysis and treats a ground-
ing in propositions as more comprehensive than a phenomenology
that experiences this brave consciousness, only enhances the sta-
tus of the work as a lapidary effort in the field.
These postulates, irrespective of the critical light under which
they have been examined in this review, are the thoughtful reflec-
tions of a serious scholar and the fruits of a profound understand-
ing of the independence of the Americas. They may well be correct
and, hence, so too would Professor Guzmdn Brito's work comport
with the first principles that nourished revolutionary develop-
ment and the birth of nationhood in an entire hemisphere. I do
not know.
What is clear is the Hegelian observation that "the owl of
Minerva flies at dusk." Certainly, it is only after the facts have
settled and found repose in fragmented time and space that wis-
dom is at all possible. The question remains: In our seductive,
enchanting, and heart-wrenching Latin America, has dusk yet
arrived?
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